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Abstract 
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disciplinary device for households. When households compete for both resources and 
members then household stability requires efficient or not too inefficient internal distribution. 
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1 Introduction
Conventional economic terminology uses “consumer” and “household” as
synonyms and with few exceptions, both theoretical and empirical economics
have treated households as if they were single consumers. Both from a nor-
mative and a positive perspective, this prevailing practice raises the question
whether distinguishing between a household and its members makes any
difference. Chiappori (1988, 1992) who is primilary interested in testable
implications regarding household demand, presents a model of collective ra-
tionality of households as an alternative to the model where households are
treated like single consumers. Our main focus here and elsewhere is norma-
tive. It lies on the impact that the nature of collective household decisions
has on market performance. The issue at hand is to what extent competitive
exchange among multi-member households leads to a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion, i.e. an efficient market outcome. The classical answer is in the affirma-
tive: market outcomes are efficient. Beyond a matter of belief, this welfare
conclusion obtains as a formal result known as the first theorem of welfare
economics in the traditional model of competitive exchange among optimiz-
ing individuals: competitive equilibrium allocations are efficient. Obviously,
the welfare conclusion persists if multi-member households are treated like
single consumers. But what if they are not, if each household member has
her own preferences and efficiency, both at the household and the economy
level, is defined in terms of these individual preferences? According to the
formal analysis of Haller (2000), the answer still is in the affirmative as long
as each household makes an optimal (efficient) choice subject to its budget
constraint and, by doing so, exhausts its budget.
Following in the footsteps of Haller (2000), we are going to elaborate fur-
ther on the normative issue of efficiency, whether and when (in)efficiency at
the household level translates into (in)efficiency at the economy level. Ob-
viously, efficiency at the houshold level need not always imply efficiency at
the economy level. This can occur even in economies consisting exclusively
of one-person households, provided that some consumers possess satiation
points in the interior of their budget sets whereas other consumers have non-
satiated preferences and exhaust their budgets. With multi-person house-
holds, however, this phenomenon is more likely. A household with negative
intra-household externalities may have a bliss point despite the fact that each
household member has monotonic preferences with respect to her individual
1
consumption. Just imagine a household composed of two smokers. Each
household member may individually prefer to always smoke more, since the
additional nicotine intake more than compensates for the deterioration of air
quality it causes. Nevertheless, the negative externalities due to air pollution
can be such that the two smokers agree on an unconstrained “optimum” con-
sumption for the household. As a consequence, efficient household decisions
can lead to inefficiency at the economy level.
In view of the smoker example, the main contribution of Haller (2000)
consists in identifying externalities such that efficient household decisions
beget efficiency at the economy level. Here we start from the opposite as-
sumption that collective household decision-making could be prone to severe
frictions and, as a consequence, to inefficiencies. Then a new and, perhaps,
more challenging question arises: How is market performance affected by in-
efficient household decisions? One intriguing possibility is that inefficiencies
at the micro level neutralize each other so that the resulting market alloca-
tion is efficient.1 The more likely scenario is that inefficiencies at the micro
level cause global inefficiency. In the sequel, two specific types of inefficient
household decisions will be isolated. While in general one would expect the
two types of inefficiency to coexist, it turns out that considerable insight
can already be gained from investigating each type in isolation. The first
type of household inefficiency results from an inefficient net trade with the
market and does not rule out global efficiency. The second type of house-
hold inefficiency results from an inefficient distribution of the household’s
aggregate consumption to individual household members and always causes
global inefficiency. Both types of inefficiencies are considered in Section 4,
after introducing a model with fixed household structure in Section 2 and
restating the first welfare theorem in Section 3.
In Section 5, we investigate more sytematically if and how inefficient net
trades by one household can be compensated by inefficient net trades of other
households so that an efficient equilibrium allocation results. In Section 6 we
address the question to what extent inefficient internal distribution — which
always leads to an inefficient equilibrium allocation — will be eliminated if
1Incidentally, a similar scenario is frequently invoked to counter the objection that
individual consumers lack full rationality as postulated by neoclassical economic theory:
Individual deviations from full rationality may offset each other and, thus, not affect
aggregates.
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households compete for resources and members. The latter requires choice of
household affiliation and, therefore, a variable household structure. We ex-
tend the model so that an allocation consists of an allocation of commodities
plus a household structure, that is a partition of the population into house-
holds. In the absence of externalities, the threat of leaving a multi-person
household and forming a single-person household eliminates inefficient inter-
nal distribution in the prevailing households. In the presence of externalities
this threat is not enough to prevent inefficient internal distribution. How-
ever, the threat to form a new household that is similar to the old one but
makes better consumption decisions proves effective.
2 Model of Competitive Exchange
To model competitive exchange among multi-member households, consider a
pure exchange economy composed of finitely many households h = 1, . . . , H.
The commodity space is IR` with ` ≥ 1. Household h is endowed with a
commodity bundle ωh ∈ IR`, ωh > 0.
Each household h consists of finitely many members i = hm with m =
1, . . . ,m(h) and m(h) ≥ 1. Put I = {hm : h = 1, . . . , H;m = 1, . . . ,m(h)}.
A generic individual i = hm ∈ I has:
• consumption set Xi = IR`+;
• preferences ∼ i on the allocation space X ≡
∏
j∈I Xj represented by a
utility function Ui : X −→ IR.
This general formulation allows for economy-wide externalities. The lat-
ter promises to be a fertile topic of research even in the traditional context of
competitive exchange among individuals. But in accordance with the main
focus of the current paper, we propose to restrict attention to externalities
that are of particular interest for an inquiry into competitive exchange among
households. In the sequel, condition (E1) will be imposed which requires that
consumption externalities, if any, exist only between members of the same
household. Some more notation is needed for an explicit formulation of such
intra-household externalities.
Let x = (xi), y = (yi), z = (zi) denote generic elements of X . For h =
1, . . . , H, define Xh = ∏m(h)n=1 Xhn with generic elements xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)).
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If x ∈ X is an allocation, then for h = 1, . . . , H, household consumption is
xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ Xh. Now we are ready to define the kind of intra-
household externalities which will be assumed hereafter.
(E1) Intra-Household Externalities: Ui(x) = Ui(xh)
for i = hm, x ∈ X .
We shall also refer to the special case of no externalities, i.e.
(E2) Absence of Externalities: Ui(x) = Ui(xi)
for i = hm, x = (xi) ∈ X .
The first theorem of welfare economics asserts that any competitive equi-
librium allocation in the sense of Walras is Pareto-optimal. Here, like in
Haller (2000), we want to allow for the possibility of a household composed
of several members who arrive at a collective decision on household consump-
tion. For the economy with social endowment ω =
∑
h ωh and consumers
i = hm (h = 1, . . . , H;m = 1, . . . ,m(h)), an efficient or Pareto-optimal
allocation is defined in the standard fashion based on individual preferences:
DEFINITION 1 An allocation x = (xi) ∈ X is efficient or Pareto-
optimal, if
(i)
∑
i xi = ω, i.e. x is feasible and
(ii) there does not exist a feasible allocation y = (yi) ∈ X with
Ui(y) ≥ Ui(x) for all i and Ui(y) > Ui(x) for some i.
To complete the modeling of competitive exchange among households,
one has to specify how households interact with the market. Haller (2000)
assumes efficient bargaining within households. The latter means that a
household h chooses an allocation at the Pareto frontier of its budget set, i.e.
an element of its efficient budget set EBh(p) as defined below. In contrast,
the present paper is aimed at investigating the impact of inefficient household
decisions on market performance. This extended research agenda necessitates
a more general definition of a competitive equilibrium among households than
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the one adopted in Haller (2000). To this end, consider a household h and a
price system p ∈ IR`. For xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ Xh, denote
p ∗ xh = p ·
m(h)∑
m=1
xhm
 .
Then h’s budget set is defined as Bh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh ≤ p · ωh}.
For future reference, we also define household h’s binding budget set or
balanced budget set as BBh(p) = {xh ∈ Xh : p ∗ xh = p · ωh}.
Demand correspondences describe the possible outcomes of collective house-
hold decision-making. A (possibly empty-valued) correspondence
Dh : IR
` =⇒ Xh
is called a demand correspondence for household h, if Dh(p) ⊆ Bh(p)
for all p ∈ IR`. How households form their demands is a key component of
the definition of a competitive equilibrium among households.
DEFINITION 2 Given a profile D = (D1, . . . , DH) of demand correspon-
dences for households, a competitive D-equilibrium (p; x) is a price sys-
tem p together with a feasible allocation x = (xi) satisfying
(iii) xh ∈ Dh(p) for h = 1, . . . , H.
Thus in a competitive equilibrium, each household makes a collective
choice under its budget constraint and markets clear. At this general level,
the concept of a competitive equilibrium among households is flexible enough
to accommodate all conceivable collective decision criteria of households. Of
course, additional restrictions on the profile D could and should be imposed
whenever warranted by the objective of the research effort. Occasionally,
it may be opportune to replace the market clearing condition (i) by a free
disposal condition:
∑
i xi ≤ ω. However, such an occasion will not arise
during the course of this investigation.
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3 Efficient Household Decisions
Efficient choice by the household refers to the individual consumption and
welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of
the household. Such a notion of efficient household decision is captured by
the concept of an efficient budget set.
Given a price system p, define consumer h’s efficient budget set EBh(p) as
the set of xh ∈ Bh(p) with the property that there is no yh ∈ Bh(p) such that
Uhm(yh) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1, . . . ,m(h);
Uhm(yh) > Uhm(xh) for some m = 1, . . . ,m(h).
Classical versions of the first theorem of welfare economics are based on
the crucial property that each consumer’s demand lies on the consumer’s bud-
get line or hyperplane — which implies Walras’ Law. This property follows
from local non-satiation, for instance monotonicity of consumer preferences.
With the possibility of multi-person households and intra-household exter-
nalities, the crucial property needs to be adapted. The modified property is
called budget exhaustion and stipulates that each household’s choice lies on
the household’s “budget line”. For example, monotonicity in own consump-
tion combined with non-negative externalities yields budget exhaustion. The
formal definition is as follows.
(BE) Budget Exhaustion: For each household h = 1, . . . , H,
and any price system p ∈ IR`, EBh(p) ⊆ BBh(p).
Notice that EB ≡ (EB1(·), . . . , EBH(·)) is an example of a profile of demand
correspondences for households. Therefore, a key result of Haller (2000) can
be rephrased as follows.
Proposition 1 (First Welfare Theorem) Suppose (E1) and (BE).
If (p; x) is a competitive EB-equilibrium, then x is a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion.
In other words, efficiency at the household level implies efficiency at the
economy level, if each household has to exhaust its budget in order to put into
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effect an efficient consumption decision for its members. For the existence of
such an equilibrium see Gersbach and Haller (1999).
4 Inefficient Household Decisions
On purely analytic grounds, it is fruitful to treat the household decision as
a two-step decision, although the household need not perceive it that way.
In the first step, the household chooses an aggregate or total consumption
bundle for the household subject to its budget constraint. In more technical
terms, the household determines its net trade with the market. In a more
graphic description, the household fixes the dimensions of an Edgeworth Box
for the household. In the second step, the household distributes its total
consumption bundle among its members. More graphically, the household
picks a point (an allocation) within its previously chosen Edgeworth Box. To
arrive at an efficient consumption decision under its budget constraint, the
household has to first choose the right Edgeworth Box and then pick a point
on the contract curve in that Edgeworth Box. Therefore, one can identify
two sources of inefficiencies committed by the household:
a) inefficient net trade with the market;
b) inefficient internal distribution.
Of course, the two types of inefficient decision-making can be compounded.
But it is analytically convenient to consider each of them separately. More
importantly, this sort of piecemeal analysis renders interesting results already.
To formalize the two types of household inefficiency, it is convenient to
introduce yet another distinguished subset of a household’s budget set. For
each household h and every price system p, we define the potentially effi-
cient budget set PEBh(p) as the set of xh = (xh1, . . . , xhm(h)) ∈ Bh(p) for
which there exists yh = (yh1, . . . , yhm(h)) ∈ EBh(p) such that∑m(h)
m=1 yhm =
∑m(h)
m=1 xhm and
Uhm(yh) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1, . . . ,m(h).
When choosing an element from its potentially efficient budget set, the house-
hold makes an efficient net trade, but may not achieve efficient internal dis-
tribution.
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4.1 Inefficient Net Trades
Suppose that a household performs an inefficient net trade with the market
which means that the household could improve (in a weak sense) the welfare
of its members by making a different choice under its budget constraint, but
in order to achieve that would have to change its net trade with the market.
If the household wants to correct its mistake after market clearing, then the
net trades of some other households would have to be altered as well, possibly
to the detriment of the welfare of the other households’ members. This line
of argument suggests that inefficient net trades might lead to an efficient
market allocation. The following formal result obtains:
Proposition 2 (Accidental Welfare Theorem)
Let ` ≥ 2 and consider a non-empty population I partitioned into households
h = 1, . . . , H. Then there exist
1. household endowments and consumer preferences satisfying (E1),
2. a profile of demand correspondences D for the associated exchange econ-
omy and
3. a competitive D-equilibrium (p∗; x∗) for that economy
with the property that
4. each household h performs an inefficient net trade with the market in
the sense that x∗h 6∈ PEBh(p∗), and
5. the allocation x∗ is Pareto-optimal.
sketch of proof. It suffices to outline the argument for the simplest case
of two commodities, ` = 2, and a single household, H = 1, with a single
member denoted i. Consequently, (E1) amounts to (E2). Let the consumer
be endowed with the commodity bundle ωi = (1, 1) and his preferences be
represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
Ui(xi) = x
1/2
i1 x
1/2
i2
for xi = (xi1, xi2) ∈ IR`+. For each price system p = (p1, p2) ∈ IR`++, this
consumer has a Marshallian demand
xi(p) =
(
p1 + p2
2p1
,
p1 + p2
2p2
)
.
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Conversely, at each consumption bundle x ∈ IR`++, this consumer’s inverse de-
mand or supporting price system is given, up to normalization, by gradUi(x),
the gradient of Ui at x.
Let us assume that instead of realizing his Marshallian net trade xi(p)−ωi
with the market, the consumer always chooses zero net trade with the mar-
ket which corresponds to the constant demand function D(p) = Di(p) ≡ ωi.
Now consider the price system p∗ = (1, 2). Then (p∗;ωi) is a competitive
D-equilibrium and ωi is a Pareto-optimal allocation for this economy. But
under his budget constraint, the consumer performs an inefficient net trade
with the market, because his actual demand ωi = (1, 1) differs from his Mar-
shallian demand xi(p
∗) = (3/2, 3/4). However, the former is Pareto-optimal
whereas the latter is socially infeasible. This proves the assertion. Q.E.D.
Obviously, this trivial example generalizes to arbitrary numbers of con-
sumers (|I| ≥ 1) and goods (` ≥ 2), to arbitrary household structures and
a wide variety of consumer characteristics including instances of competitive
equilibria with active trade like in cases of self-inflicted rationing with net
trades 1
2
[xi(p)−ωi]. Why then the attribute “accidental”? The reason is that
the phenomenon of inefficient household decisions consistent with market ef-
ficiency is frequent in some sense and rare in some other sense. In support of
this assertion, let us revisit the case ` = 2. Let there be H ≥ 2 single-person
households, with both households and consumers labelled i = 1, 2, . . . , H.
Furthermore, let each consumer i be endowed with a strictly positive com-
modity bundle ωi = (ωi1, ωi2) ∈ IR`++ and have preferences of the Cobb-
Douglas type,
Ui(xi) = x
αi
i1x
1−αi
i2 for xi = (xi1, xi2) ∈ Xi,
with 0 < αi < 1.
Now fix ωi, i ∈ I, and some λ > 0. Then there exist unique exponents
αi, i ∈ I, and coefficients µ1 > 0, . . . , µH > 0 such that
µ1 · grad U1(ω1) = . . . = µH · grad UH(ωH) = (λ, 1).(1)
Namely, αi =
ωi1
ωi2
· λ
/(
1 + ωi1
ωi2
· λ
)
, i ∈ I, is necessary and sufficient for (1).
Equation (1) in turn is necessary and sufficient for Pareto-optimality of the
initial allocation of resources. Hence, whenever (1) holds, the essence of the
above one-consumer example is preserved: Choose again Di(p) ≡ ωi for each
i and set p∗ = (λ, 2). Then (p∗; (ω1, . . . , ωH)) is a competitive D-equilibrium
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with inefficient net trades, but an efficient market outcome. This shows
that in a specific sense, the phenomenon of inefficient household decisions
consistent with market efficiency is a frequent one: Given the endowments
ωi, i ∈ I, variation of λ yields a continuum of corresponding examples. On
the other hand, validity of (1) or, equivalently, Pareto-optimality of the ini-
tial allocation is not robust with respect to small perturbations of the pref-
erence parameters α1, . . . , αH . In fact, the no trade allocation given by the
endowments ωi, i ∈ I, is not Pareto-optimal for most choices of preference
parameters. But if the initial allocation of resources is not Pareto-optimal,
then the foregoing construction of inefficient net trades leading to an efficient
market outcome easily collapses. This suggests that in a certain sense, the
phenomenon of inefficient household decisions compatible with market effi-
ciency is a rare one.
4.2 Inefficient Internal Distribution
Suppose that a household performs an efficient net trade with the mar-
ket which means that the household can achieve an efficient choice under
its budget constraint by suitably dividing its aggregate consumption bun-
dle among its members. But the actually chosen internal distribution of
commodities may be inefficient in the sense that redistribution within the
household can improve the welfare of its members. If so, the mistake can
be rectified simply by internal reallocation without affecting the welfare of
members of other households. This leads to the conclusion that inefficient
internal distribution, a particular type of inefficient household decision, al-
ways begets global inefficiency. Indeed, the following formal result holds true
where PEB ≡ (PEB1(·), . . . , PEBH(·)) denotes the profile of potentially
efficient budget correspondences.
Proposition 3 (Anti-Welfare Theorem) Suppose (E1).
If (p; x) is a competitive PEB-equilibrium and xh 6∈ EBh(p) for some house-
hold h, then x is not a Pareto-optimal allocation.
PROOF. Assume (E1). Let (p; x) be as hypothesized and h be a household
with xh 6∈ EBh(p). Since xh ∈ PEBh(p), there exists zh ∈ EBh(p) with∑m(h)
m=1 zhm =
∑m(h)
m=1 xhm and
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Uhm(zh) ≥ Uhm(xh) for all m = 1, . . . ,m(h).
Since zh ∈ EBh(p), but xh 6∈ EBh(p), Uhm(zh) > Uhm(xh) has to hold for
some m = 1, . . . ,m(h). Now set yh = zh and yk = xk for households k 6= h.
This defines a feasible allocation y = (yi)i∈I . Because of (E1),
Ui(y) > Ui(x) for certain members i of household h and
Uj(y) = Uj(x) for all other consumers j.
Hence as asserted, x is not Pareto-optimal. Q.E.D.
5 Compensation Across Households
After having identified how inefficient household decisions may or may not
beget efficiency, we consider (in)efficient decisions across households and ask
whether inefficient net trades by one household can be compensated by inef-
ficient net trades of other households. This question is irrelevant in the case
of the specific consumer characteristics we have used to derive and discuss
the Accidental Welfare Theorem, because of special auto-corrective features
of that case. Notice that in that case, consumers would always pick the
right allocation, ω = (ω1, . . . , ωH), though possibly for the wrong reasons.
Namely, let Di(p) ≡ ωi and p∗ = (1, 2) as before and further p0 = (1, 1).
Then (p∗;ω) is a D-equilibrium and, up to price normalization, (p0;ω) is the
EB-equilibrium. In fact, if D̂i = Di for some but not all i and D̂i = EBi
for all others, then (p0;ω) is the D̂-equilibrium. Thus there are only two
possibilities: If all consumers exhibit totally inelastic demands Di, equilib-
rium prices may be distorted away from the Walrasian equilibrium prices, yet
still the Walrasian equilibrium allocation obtains. If some consumers exhibit
Marshallian demands and the rest exhibits totally inelastic demands, then
both equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities turn out to be Walrasian.
Now let us consider instead a situation where an inefficient net trade
made by one household leads to an inefficient equilibrium allocation, unless
it is compensated by an inefficient net trade of another household. It suffices
to focus on the simplest case of two commodities, ` = 2, and two one-person
households h1 = {i} and h2 = {j}. Consequently, (E1) amounts to (E2).
Let consumers be endowed with the strictly positive bundles ωi = (ωi1, ωi2)
and ωj = (ωj1, ωj2). Preferences are represented by the respective Cobb-
Douglas utility functions
11
Ui(xi) = x
αi
i1 x
1−αi
i2 ,
Uj(xj) = x
αj
j1 x
1−αj
j2
for xi, xj ∈ IR2+. Finally, let us assume that the initial endowment allocation
ω = (ωi, ωj) is not Pareto-optimal, contrary to our previous assumption, so
that there are potential gains from trade. Let us normalize the price system
p by setting p1 = 1. Then the consumers’ Marshallian demands are given by
xi(p) =
(
αi(ωi1 + p2 ωi2), (1− αi)ωi + p2ωi2
p2
)
,
xj(p) =
(
αj(ωj1 + p2 ωj2), (1− αj)ωj + p2ωj2
p2
)
.
With respect to these demand functions, there exists a competitive equilib-
rium (p0; x0) with the price system p0 = (1, p02) given by
p02 =
(1− αi)ωi1 + (1− αj)ωj1
αiωi2 + αjωj2
.
Suppose now that consumer i chooses his demand according to
x˜i(p) =
(
αi(ωi1 + p2ωi2) + ∆i,
(1− αi)(ωi1 + p2ωi2)
p2
− ∆i
p2
)
with some mistake ∆i 6= 0 that is independent of p2 and satisfies |∆i| <
min{αi, 1−αi} ·ωi1. While consumer i now performs an inefficient net trade
under her budget constraint, consumer j is assumed to behave according
to his Marshallian demand. Consider the resulting competitive equilibrium
(p∗; x∗) with
p∗2 =
(1− αi)ωi1 + (1− αj)ωj1 −∆i
αiωi2 + αjωj2
.
The allocation x∗ will be inefficient regardless of the equilibrium price p∗2.
Suppose now that consumer j makes an inefficient net trade as well according
to
x˜j(p) =
(
αj(ωj1 + p2ωj2)−∆j, (1− αj)(ωj1 + p2ωj2)
p2
+
∆j
p2
)
(2)
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for some ∆j 6= 0 independent of p2 and such that |∆j| < min{αj, 1−αj}·ωj1.
The resulting competitive equilibrium is (p∗∗; x∗∗) with prices p∗∗1 = 1 and
p∗∗2 =
(1−αi)ωi1+(1−αj)ωj1−∆1−∆2
αiωi2+αjomegaj2
= p02 − ∆1+∆2αiωi2+αjωj2
(3)
The resulting allocation x∗∗ is Pareto-optimal if and only if the marginal
rates of substitution for the two consumers coincide. The latter condition
amounts to
ωi1 + p
∗∗
2 ωi2 −∆i
ωi1 + p∗∗2 ωi2 + ∆i
=
ωj1 + p
∗∗
2 ωj2 + ∆j
ωj1 + p∗∗2 ωj2 −∆j
(4)
or
F (∆i,∆j) ≡ ωi1 + p
∗∗
2 ωi2 −∆i
ωi1 + p∗∗2 ωi2 + ∆i
− ωj1 + p
∗∗
2 ωj2 + ∆j
ωj1 + p∗∗2 ωj2 −∆j
= 0.(5)
Now at the Walrasian outcome, F (0, 0) = 0 and ∂F/∂∆j(0, 0) 6= 0.
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, there exists an open neigh-
borhood Ni(0) such that for all ∆i ∈ Ni(0), there is a unique ∆j(∆i) with
F (∆i,∆j(∆i)) = 0. That is to each small “mistake” ∆i corresponds exactly
one “compensating mistake” ∆j(∆i) that leads to an optimal equilibrium
allocation. ∆j(∆i) can be explicitly determined by solving the quadratic
equation in ∆j associated with (4).
The analysis of this example shows among other things:
Proposition 4 (Compensating Inefficient Net Trades)
There exist economies with intra-household externalities and at least two
households, labelled h1 and h2, with two profiles of demand correspondences,
D∗ = (D∗1, . . . , D
∗
H) and D
∗∗ = (D∗∗1 , . . . , D
∗∗
H ), with a competitive D
∗–
equilibrium (p∗; x∗) and a competitive D∗∗–equilibrium (p∗∗; x∗∗) such that:
1. D∗h1 = D
∗∗
h1
and D∗h = D
∗∗
h = EBh for all h 6∈ {h1, h2}.
2. D∗h1 ∩ EBh1 = ∅, D∗h2 = EBh2, and
the allocation x∗ is Pareto inefficient.
3. D∗∗h1 ∩ EBh1 = ∅, D∗∗h2 ∩ EBh2 = ∅, and
the allocation x∗∗ is Pareto efficient (Pareto-optimal).
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Let us add a few more observations to the last example and the implied
proposition. First, the example exhibits single-person households and ab-
sence of externalities. Second, given ∆i ∈ Ni(0), consumer j has to make
the “right mistake” ∆j(∆i) in order to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome;
otherwise, the ensuing equilibrium allocation is not Pareto-optimal. This
observation parallels the “accidental” nature of the conclusion of the Acci-
dental Welfare Theorem. But different parameters of the model are allowed
to vary in the two situations. Now the mistakes have to match whereas
before consumer characteristics had to match. Third, a suitable pair of mis-
takes, ∆ = (∆i,∆j) with ∆j = ∆j(∆i) determines a unique Pareto-optimal
allocation x∗∗(∆). Conversely, select any point x∗∗ on the contract curve
such that (in the Edgeworth Box) the straight line L through x∗∗ and ω is
negatively sloped. For instance, a core allocation will do. Choose p∗∗2 > 0
so that p∗∗ = (1, p∗∗2 ) is a normal vector to this line, i.e. L is the bud-
get line with respect to the price system p∗∗. Set ∆i = x∗∗i1 − xi1(p∗∗) and
∆j = −[x∗∗j1 − xj1(p∗∗)]. Then ∆j = ∆j(∆i) and x∗∗ = x∗∗(∆). Finally,
observe that the Marshallian demands of Cobb-Douglas consumers exhibit
fixed expenditure shares. Therefore, the “mistakes” ∆i and ∆j can be inter-
preted as mistakes in the determination of the expenditure shares.
Next let us consider a different situation where an inefficient net trade
made by one household cannot be compensated by an inefficient net trade of
another household and necessarily leads to an inefficient equilibrium alloca-
tion. To this end, we focus again on the simplest case of two commodities,
` = 2, and two one-person households h1 = {i} and h2 = {j}.
Let consumer i be endowed with the commodity bundle ωi = (ωi1, ωi2) =
(2, 1) and consumer j be endowed with ωj = (ωj1, ωj2) = (6, 12). Preferences
are represented by the respective utility functions
Ui(xi) = min{xi1 , xi2},
Uj(xj) = x
1/2
j1 x
1/2
j2
for xi, xj ∈ IR2+. Then the consumers’ Marshallian demands are given by
xi(p) =
(2p1 + p2
p1 + p2
,
2p1 + p2
p1 + p2
)
,
xj(p) =
(6p1 + 12p2
2p1
,
6p1 + 12p2
2p2
)
.
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With respect to these demand functions, there exists a competitive equilib-
rium (p0; x0) with the price system p0 = (1, p02) given by p
0
2 = (
√
19 − 1)/6.
This shows that there are potential gains from trade and the initial endow-
ment allocation is not Pareto-optimal.
Suppose now that consumer i chooses her demand according to
x˜i(p) = (xi(p) + ωi)/2.
Then consumer i performs an inefficient net trade under her budget con-
straint, by means of self-inflicted rationing, realizing only half of her efficient
net trade. The corresponding individual excess demand function is continu-
ous, bounded, and satisfying Walras Law on the price simplex.
Suppose further that consumer j chooses his demand according to a demand
function x˜j(·) such that the corresponding individual excess demand function
is continuous and satisfying Walras Law in the interior of the price simplex;
moreover, it satisfies the standard boundary condition. Then by standard
arguments, the economy with these demand functions has a competitive equi-
librium (p∗; x∗) with p∗  0. Furthermore, x∗i  0, x∗j  0 and x∗i1 > x∗i2.
Therefore, it is possible to find a feasible allocation that strictly Pareto dom-
inates x∗. The important point is that we do not impose any restrictions on
the demand function x˜j(·) other than the standard assumptions that guar-
antee existence of equilibrium. Hence it can differ from Marshallian demand
in almost arbitrary ways. Thus we obtain:
Proposition 5 (Lack of Compensation)
There exists an economy with several one-person households and the following
property: If household 1 uses a particular inefficient demand function d1
and each household h = 2, . . . , H uses any demand function dh that satisfies
standard conditions, then there exists an inefficient competitive d–equilibrium
allocation.
Notice that the demand function given by (2) satisfies standard conditions
and qualifies for the foregoing impossibility result. On the other hand, the
particular demand function chosen for the Leontief consumer does not exhibit
a constant shift ∆i 6= 0 of expenditure shares. The reason for this choice is
purely technical: For the Leontief consumer, a constant shift ∆i 6= 0 would
lead to a violation of the non-negativity of demand at certain prices. It is
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possible, albeit tedious, to recast the example with locally but not globally
constant ∆i and ∆j.
6 When Outside Options Beget Efficiency
We found that inefficiency can beget efficiency, that inefficient individual or
household consumption decisions can lead to Pareto-optimal equilibrium al-
locations. If an agent’s mistake (inefficient net trade to be precise) is suitably
compensated by the mistakes (inefficient net trades) of others, then the over-
all allocation can be efficient. However, an inefficient net trade need not be
compensated and — as we demonstrate by example — in some cases cannot
be compensated. Furthermore, if the sole source of an inefficient household
decision is inefficient internal distribution, then by the Anti-Welfare The-
orem, an equilibrium allocation cannot be Pareto-optimal. Elimination or
reduction of inefficient internal distribution would improve welfare and obvi-
ously would be desirable.
Notice that inefficient internal distribution on the part of households con-
stitutes the analogue of technological inefficiency in the production sector.
It is a time honored theme in industrial economics that increased competi-
tion among producers reduces both allocative and technical inefficiencies.2
Moreover, potential competition may suffice to further efficiency. To quote
Schumpeter (1975):
It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we
now have in mind acts not only when in being but also when it is
merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks.3
In a similar vein, the concept of contestable markets forwarded by Baumol,
Panzer and Willig (1986) postulates that potential hit-and-run competition
has the same effect as actual competition.
In this section, we apply the idea that competitive forces can serve as a
disciplinary device to the consumption sector. The hope is that competition
will cause the elimination or reduction of inefficient internal distribution in
households in a similar manner as it causes erosion of managerial slack in
2Leibenstein’s much acclaimed 1966 article has raised the awareness for technological
inefficiencies or X-inefficiencies. Hart (1983) formalizes the idea that competition in the
product market reduces managerial slack.
3Ibid., p. 85.
16
firms. Yet we know from the Anti-Welfare Theorem that competition for
resources alone will be to no avail in this respect. But it turns out that if
household stability is threatened by inefficient internal distribution, if in a
sense households are competing for resources and members, then the house-
holds which exist in equilibrium must make efficient or not too inefficient
decisions. This presumes that dissatisfied household members have the op-
tion to leave and that household stability (requiring that nobody wants to
exercise the option) is an additional equilibrium condition. Accordingly, we
are going to investigate whether and to what extent inefficient household de-
cisions due to inefficient internal distribution are sustainable in equilibrium,
if individuals have the option to form new and potentially more efficient
households.
The outside options individuals have may vary: an individual may form
a single-person household, join another household or form a new household
with fractions of existing households. Individuals may leave a household
because they dislike its composition. For this reason alone, certain households
may not be viable if they are a total mismatch. However, even if a member
is content with the household’s composition, the member may be dissatisfied
with the collective consumption decision and decide to leave. One reason
could be that the endowment of the household is such that at the prevailing
prices, the household can afford relatively little consumption compared to
other households the individual might conceivably join. Another reason could
be that the individual gets a bad deal because fellow members get a great deal
at his expense. A final reason could be an inefficient consumption decision
by the household.
The household cannot do anything about the first reason. It is bound to
break up if it lacks sufficient resources to be attractive for its members. The
household may be able to preempt the other two causes of a break-up, by
not exploiting some of its members for the benefit of others and by making
efficient consumption decisions or at least not too inefficient ones. Then the
question is how much inefficiency a household can afford without giving a
member a reason to leave. Under certain circumstances the answer will be
‘none’: household stability requires efficiency. In other words, the threat of
desertion forces household efficiency. One can also ask how much exploitation
a household can afford without giving a member a reason to leave. Under
the very same circumstances the answer will be ‘none’ as well: household
stability requires absence of exploitation.
Multi-member households have not been essential for the major results
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obtained until now. The key arguments can already be made in the tradi-
tional context of single-person households and can be readily extended to
the broader context of multi-person households. Moreover, so far the house-
hold structure was fixed. The new aim necessitates a richer model. The
option to leave a household presupposes alternative households and a vari-
able household structure. Imposing stability conditions familiar from the
bilateral matching literature4 makes the household structure endogenous.
Consequently, we extend our analysis to a model with endogenous house-
hold structure. Inefficient consumption decisions in multi-member house-
holds may induce individuals to leave and form new households or join other
households, if they have these options. Our basic hypothesis is that com-
petitive exchange across households combined with certain outside options
may eliminate or mitigate inefficient internal distribution in the households
prevailing in equilibrium.
6.1 Variable Household Structure
To elaborate on the theme of disciplinary capacity of competition, we consider
a finite pure exchange economy with variable household structure. There
exists a given finite and non-empty set of individuals or consumers, I. A
(potential) household is any non-empty subset h of the population I. H =
{h ⊆ I|h 6= ∅} denotes the set of all potential households. The households
that actually form give rise to a household structure P , that is a partition
of the population I into non-empty subsets. The commodity space, individual
consumption sets, household consumption sets and commodity allocations
are defined as before.
With a fixed household structure, household membership was part of an
individual’s identity. Individual i = hm was the m’s member of household
h. With variable household structure, household membership is an endoge-
nous outcome. An individual may care about household composition and
household consumption. Different members may exert different consumption
externalities upon others. We maintain the assumption of intra-household
externalities. But instead of (E1) it now assumes the form
4See the seminal contribution by Gale and Shapley (1962) and the monograph by Roth
and Sotomayor (1990).
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(HSP) Household-Specific Preferences: Ui(x;h) = Ui(xh;h)
for i ∈ h, h ∈ H,x ∈ X .
In the following, we are going to consider the special case of
(GSE) Group-Size Externalities: Ui(x;h) = Vi(xi; |h|)
for i ∈ h, h ∈ H,x ∈ X .
In this case, individual i cares only about own consumption and household
size. Still, preferences over own consumption may change with household
size and, vice versa, preferences over household size can depend on own con-
sumption. In the separable case, Ui(x;h) = ui(xi) + vi(|h|) and preferences
over own consumption and preferences over household size are independent.
If vi ≡ 0, then the separable case reduces to (E2), that is absence of exter-
nalities.
Every potential household h is endowed with a commodity bundle ωh > 0.
In general, the aggregate or social endowment depends on the prevailing
household structure P and equals ωP =
∑
h∈P ωh. The social endowment is
independent of the household structure if (and only if) the endowment of
each household equals the sum of the individual endowments of its members.
We call this condition individual property rights.
(IPR) Individual Property Rights: ωh =
∑
i∈h ωi for all h ∈ H.
After having generalized preferences and endowments to allow for vari-
able household structures, we can define budget sets, efficient budget sets,
balanced budget sets, and demand correspondences for arbitrary households
accordingly. Define an allocation of the economy with variable household
structure as a pair (x;P ) where x ∈ X is an allocation of commodities and
P is a household structure. The allocation is feasible, if
∑
i∈I xi = ωP . De-
fine a state of the economy as a triple (p,x;P ) such that p ∈ IR` is a price
system and (x;P ) ∈ X × P is an allocation, i.e. x = (xi)i∈ I is an allocation
of commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a household structure,
a partition of the population into households). For a state (p,x;P ) and an
individual i ∈ I, let P (i) denote the household in P (the element of P ) to
which i belongs. We say that in state (p,x;P ),
(a) consumer i can benefit from exit, if P (i) 6= {i} and there exists
yi ∈ B{i}(p) such that Ui(yi; {i}) > Ui(xP(i);P (i));
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(b) consumer i can benefit from joining another household g,
if g ∈ P , g 6= P (i) and there exists yg∪{i} ∈ Bg∪{i}(p) such that
Uj(yg∪{i}; g ∪ {i}) > Uj(xP(j);P (j)) for all j ∈ g ∪ {i};
(c) a group of consumers h can benefit from forming a new household,
if h 6∈ P and there exists yh ∈ Bh(p) such that
Uj(yh;h) > Uj(xP(j);P (j)) for all j ∈ h.
In the spirit of the matching literature (see e.g. Gale and Shapley (1962),
Roth and Sotomayor (1990)), a household structure is a “matching” broadly
defined and stability of the matching requires that no group of consumers
can benefit from forming a new household. It is important to note that
in our context stability of a matching depends on household decisions and
market conditions, that is the prevailing price system. Next we generalize
the notion of competitive equilibrium so that the household structure or
matching becomes a constituent part of the equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3 Let D = (Dh)h∈H be a profile of demand correspondences
for households and (p,x;P ) be a state of the economy. The state (p,x;P ) is
a competitive D-equilibrium if the allocation (x;P ) is feasible and
(iv) xh ∈ Dh(p) for h ∈ P .
Finally, we generalize the notion of efficient allocation to the current setting
where the household structure forms an integral part of an allocation.
DEFINITION 4 An allocation (x;P ) is fully Pareto-optimal if it is
feasible and there is no other feasible allocation which is weakly preferred to
(x;P ) by all consumers and strictly preferred to (x;P ) by some consumer(s).
6.2 Equilibrium Efficiency of Households
We start with a set of strong assumptions, including absence of externalities,
which imply that in equilibrium every multi-member household makes effi-
cient consumption decisions — unless some member benefits from exit. If a
multi-member household does make inefficient consumption decisions and its
members prefer to stay despite the exit option, then some sort of externality
has to be present.
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Proposition 6 (Household Efficiency)
Suppose IPR, absence of externalities, continuity and local non-satiation of
consumer preferences. Let D be a profile of demand correspondences for
households and let (p,x;P ) be a D-equilibrium at which p  0 and no con-
sumer benefits from exit. Then xh ∈ EBh(p) for every multi-member house-
hold h in P .
proof: Let consumer characteristics, D and (p,x;P ) as hypothesized. Sup-
pose there exists a household h ∈ P with |h| ≥ 2 and xh 6∈ EBh(p). Then
there exists yh ∈ Bh(p) with
Uj(yj) > Uj(xj) for some j ∈ h;
Ui(yi) ≥ Ui(xi) for all i ∈ h.
Because of continuity and p  0, we can choose an x0i ∈ EB{i}(p) for
each i ∈ h, that is x0i maximizes the utility of consumer i when the consumer
forms a single-person household and is trading from his individual endowment
ωi at prices p. Since no consumer can benefit from exit at state (p,x;P ),
Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(x0i ) for all i ∈ h. Hence,
Uj(yj) > Uj(x
0
j) for some j ∈ h;
Ui(yi) ≥ Ui(x0i ) for all i ∈ h.
Therefore, p · yj > p · ωj for some j ∈ h and, by local non-satiation, p · yj ≥
p · ωi for all individuals i ∈ h. Summation and IPR yield
p ∗ yh = p ·
∑
i∈h
yi
 > p ·
∑
i∈h
ωi
 = p · ωh
which, however, is a contradiction to yh ∈ Bh(p). Hence, to the contrary,
xh ∈ EBh(p) for all h ∈ P with |h| ≥ 2. Q.E.D.
Let us state some immediate but important consequences of the proposi-
tion.
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Corollary 1 Suppose IPR, absence of externalities, continuity and local non-
satiation of consumer preferences. Let D be a profile of demand correspon-
dences for households. Consider a D-equilibrium (p,x;P ) at which p  0,
every household makes efficient net trades and no consumer benefits from
exit. Then
(i) (p,x;P ) is an EB-equilibrium at which no group of consumers can
benefit from forming a new household.
(ii) (p,x) is a traditional competitive equilibrium where each agent acts
and trades individually.
proof: Let consumer characteristics, D and (p,x;P ) as hypothesized. By
assumption, every household makes efficient net trades which means xh ∈
EBh(p) for every single-person household h in P . By the proposition, xh ∈
EBh(p) for every multi-member household h in P . By assumption, no con-
sumer benefits from exit. Hence (p,x;P ) is an EB-equilibrium at which no
consumer benefits from exit. By the Neutrality Theorem (Proposition 1) of
Gersbach and Haller (2002), (p,x;P ) is also an EB-equilibrium at which no
consumer can benefit from joining another household. By a similar argument,
one can further demonstrate that (p,x;P ) is an EB-equilibrium at which no
group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household. Thus (i). By
the Neutrality Theorem (Proposition 1) of Gersbach and Haller (2002), (i)
implies (ii). Q.E.D.
The corollary depicts circumstances under which households cannot afford
any inefficient distribution without giving a member a reason to leave. By
assertion (ii) of the corollary, household members cannot fare any better
or worse than as single consumers, hence under the same circumstances, a
household cannot afford to exploit any of its members without giving them a
reason to leave. Thus household stability requires absence of inefficiencies and
absence of exploitation. The assumptions also guarantee Pareto-optimality of
the equilibrium allocation in addition to equilibrium efficiency of households.
Moreover, under these circumstances, the condition that no consumer can
benefit from exit implies that no consumer can benefit from joining another
household. This implication need not hold in the case of externalities to
which we turn next.
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6.3 Externalities and (In)efficiency
In the absence of externalities, already the exit option induces efficient dis-
tribution of resources within households. When externalities are present it is
conceivable that inefficient distribution of resources within households per-
sists despite the opportunities of individuals to explore alternative household
affiliations and alternative commodity allocations at the going prices. As will
become clear, the three possible outside options: to exit and go single, to join
another household, and to form a new household without any restrictions,
can differ considerably in their effectiveness in preventing inefficient house-
hold decisions when externalities are present.
Our fundamental result is that inefficiencies will be eliminated provided
that each household has similar counterparts in society (in the prevailing
household structure) with respect to the nature and strength of externalities
and consumers are free to form new households. In contrast, the subsequent
example shows that the more restrictive options to exit and go single or to
leave and join another household prove insufficient to eliminate all inefficien-
cies. As a rule, however, they are not without consequences as the example
also demonstrates. Namely, excessive allocative distortions as well as exces-
sive manifestations of power could cause exit of some household member.
This, too, is illustrated by the example.
Proposition 7 Suppose IPR and GSE and that for each i ∈ I, preferences
are continuous, convex and strictly monotone in own consumption. Let D be
a profile of demand correspondences for households and let (p,x;P ) be a D-
equilibrium at which no group benefits from forming a new household. If g and
h are two multi-member households in P of equal size, that is |g| = |h| > 1,
then xg ∈ EBg(p) and xh ∈ EBh(p).
proof: Let g and h as hypothesized. We claim that xg ∈ EBg(p) and
xh ∈ EBh(p). By symmetry, if suffices to show xh ∈ EBh(p). Suppose
to the contrary that xh 6∈ EBh(p). Then there exists x′h ∈ Bh(p) with
Vi(x
′
i ; |h|) ≥ Vi(xi ; |h|) for all i ∈ h and Vi(x′i ; |h|) > Vi(xi ; |h|) for some
i ∈ h. By continuity and strict monotonicity, there exists x∗h ∈ Bh(p) with∑
i∈h x∗i =
∑
i∈h x′i and Vi(x
∗
i ; |h|) > Vi(xi ; |h|) for all i ∈ h.
Let us turn to household g momentarily. Because of xg ∈ Bg(p) and IPR,
there exists a group f of |g| − 1 members of g with ∑j∈f pxj ≤ ∑j∈f pωj.
For otherwise, for each group f of |g|−1 members of g, ∑j∈f pxj > ∑j∈f pωj
and the one member jf of g who does not belong to f would have to satisfy
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pxjf < pωjf . Consequently, every member of j of g would satisfy pxj < pωj
and each group f of |g| − 1 members of g satisfied ∑j∈f pxj < ∑j∈f pωj, a
contradiction. Choose a group f of |g| − 1 members of g with ∑j∈f pxj ≤∑
j∈f pωj.
Let us now turn to household h again and proceed with an x∗h ∈ Bh(p)
such that Vi(x
∗
i ; |h|) > Vi(xi ; |h|) for all i ∈ h. Because of x∗h ∈ Bh(p) and
IPR, there exists i ∈ h with px∗i ≤ pωi. Let us choose such an i and consider
the new household k = f ∪ {i} and the household allocation yk ∈ Xk given
by yj = xj for j ∈ f and yj = x∗i for j = i. Then k 6∈ P , |k| = |g| = |h|
and yk ∈ Bk(p) where g and h are the original households. Because of
GSE, Vj(yj ; |k|) = Vj(xj ; |g|) for j ∈ f and Vj(yj ; |k|) > Vj(xj ; |h|) for
j = i. By continuity and strict monotonicity, there exists zk ∈ Bk(p) with∑
j∈k zj =
∑
j∈k yj and Vj(zj ; |k|) > Vj(xj ; |P (j)|) for all j ∈ k. But this
contradicts the hypothesis that at the state (p,x;P ) no group can benefit
from forming a new household. Hence xh ∈ EBh(p) has to hold as asserted.
Q.E.D.
What drives the argument in the foregoing proof is that in equilibrium,
for example a member of a two-person household and member of another
two-person household should not benefit from forming a new two-person
household, and likewise for larger households of equal size. If a household
member can only leave and go single or join another household, then the
argument does not go through. This can be seen in the following example
which exhibits several other interesting features.
Example. We consider a society of N = 2n, n > 1 individuals so that
I = {1, . . . , N}. Assume ` = 2. All individuals are identical. Each i ∈ I is
endowed with the commodity bundle ωi = (1, 1) and has preferences repre-
sented by the utility function Ui, given as follows for i ∈ h ∈ H:
Ui(xh;h) = (1 + x
1
i )(1 + x
2
i ) if h = {i},
Ui(xh;h) = (1 + x
1
i )(1 + x
2
i ) + g if |h| = 2,
Ui(xh;h) = (1 + x
1
i )(1 + x
2
i )− c if |h| > 2,
with g > 0 and c > 0. Thus individuals would like to form two-person
households but dislike larger households.
As a benchmark, let us consider the state s∗ = (x∗, p;P ) where
x∗ = (ωi)i∈I , p = (1, 1), and P = {{2ν − 1, 2ν} : ν = 1, . . . , n}. The state
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s∗ is an EB-equilibrium at which no group of consumers can benefit from
forming a new household. The allocation (x∗;P ) is fully Pareto-optimal.
By Corollary 1 (ii), (p,x∗) is a traditional competitive equilibrium where
each agent acts and trades individually. Furthermore, local non-satiation of
preferences implies that (p,x∗) belongs to the core of the traditional pure
exchange economy.
Next, let us define for 0 <  < 1 the feasible commodity allocation x() =
(xi())i∈I by setting xi() = (1+, 1−) for i odd and xi() = (1−, 1+) for
i even. Then one can define a profile of household demand correspondences
D so that the state (x(), p;P ) is a D-equilibrium. Suppose 2 < g. Then:
(a) xh() 6∈ EBh(p) for all h ∈ P .
(b) In state (x(), p;P ), no consumer can benefit from exit.
(c) In state (x(), p;P ), no consumer can benefit from joining another
household.
Assertion (a) holds, since x∗h strictly dominates xh() for each household h ∈
P . Specifically, each of these households performs an efficient net trade with
the market, but an inefficient internal distribution of resources. Assertion
(b) holds, since for all i ∈ h ∈ P , Ui(xh();h) = 4 − 2 + g which exceeds
the maximal utility level ui(x
∗
i ) = 4 the consumer can achieve as a single
person at the prevailing prices. To show assertion (c), suppose a consumer
i ∈ h ∈ P joins another two-person household g ∈ P and each member of
the three-person household g∪{i} fares better than before. Then because of
(b) and the negative group externality −c, each j ∈ g ∪ {i} must consume
a bundle yj such that uj(yj) > uj(x
∗
j). Therefore, pyj > pωj for j ∈ g ∪ {i},
since (p,x∗) is a traditional competitive equilibrium where each agent acts
and trades individually. Hence yg∪{i} 6∈ Bg∪{i}(p) and consumer i cannot
benefit from joining household g.
This specification of the model satisfies IPR, GSE and continuity, convex-
ity, and strict monotonicity of preferences. At the D-equilibrium (x(), p;P ),
there are n ≥ 2 households of size 2. No consumer can benefit from exit or
joining another household. In contrast to the case without externalities, these
two stability conditions alone do not require households to make efficient de-
cisions. However, by the argument of Proposition 7, some of the existing
households would break up, if fractions of existing households could combine
into new households and make more efficient consumption decisions.
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Instead of making efficient net trades with the market followed by inef-
ficient internal distribution, households could be making different mistakes.
For instance, let n = 2r with r ∈ IN so that N = 4r, and set for 0 <  < 1
and i ∈ I: yi() = (1+, 1−) if i ≤ r and yi() = (1−, 1+) if i > r. Then
y() = (yi())i∈I is a feasible commodity allocation and the state (y(), p;P )
has the same properties as the state (x(), p;P ), except that now households
are making inefficient net trades with the market followed by efficient internal
distribution.
Notice that even when inefficiencies within households cannot be ruled
out, the weaker stability conditions can have some welfare implications. First,
in order to prevent a consumer from leaving, the degree of inefficiency cannot
be too large. In case 2 > g, a consumer would benefit from exit. Therefore,
2 ≤ g has to hold to prevent exit. Thus the exit option limits the degree of
inefficiency a household can afford. Second, in order to prevent a consumer
from exit, the gains and losses from internal redistribution cannot be too
large. To illustrate this point, consider for 0 <  < 1 the feasible commodity
allocation z() = (zi())i∈I by setting zi() = (1 − , 1 − ) for i odd and
zi() = (1 + , 1 + ) for i even. Then the allocation (z;P ) is fully Pareto-
optimal and the state (z, p;P ) is an EB-equilibrium. But in each household
h ∈ P , internal redistribution causes the even numbered member to gain
at the expense of the odd numbered person. To prevent the odd numbered
consumers to benefit from exit, it has to be the case that  < g/3. Hence
excessive allocative distortions as well as excessive manifestations of power
would cause exit of some household member. If externalities become smaller,
then there is less and less leeway for distortions and exercise of power. In
the limit, without externalities, household decisions have to be efficient and
there cannot be any gains and losses from household membership.
Both the last proposition and the example can be reformulated in terms
of type economies, at the cost of additional notation. Consumer preferences
then depend on household profile (number of each type present) rather than
household size. In the proposition, the condition of equal household size has
to be replaced by equal household profile. In the alternative example, one
obtains a simple model of bilateral matching or a “marriage model”, if there
are two types (male and female) and consumers prefer heterogeneous two-
person households to other households.
Whether competitive forces can have an efficiency enhancing influence on
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household decisions depends on several factors. Above all, household mem-
bers must not be locked into existing households by legal provisions or social
conventions. For if household members are forced or feel obliged to stay, then
the outside option is simply non-existent. Further, group preferences must
not dominate consumption preferences. For if a household member finds
the household extremely attractive relative to alternative households, then
the member might stay regardless of consumption decisions. Similarly, if
a member considers the household composition very unsatisfactory in com-
parison to other conceivable households, then the individual may want to
leave irrespective of consumption decisions. In either case the outside op-
tion is ineffective. In contrast, the conclusion of the last proposition rests
on the opportunity to form a new household of equal size or, more gener-
ally, of equal or similar composition so that the current and the alternative
new household are equally attractive or comparable in terms of membership.
Then the consumption decision becomes decisive for the choice to stay or to
leave — which puts the less efficient household at a disadvantage. Still, the
threat of outside options is empty if new potential households suffer from
the same inefficiencies as existing ones. However, it is plausible that in the
process of regrouping and reallocation, individuals search for and realize ef-
ficiency gains. If the threat of departure is credible, then household stability
requires efficient decisions or at least avoidance of severe inefficiencies. The
prevailing or, to be precise, stable households find ways to avoid grave mis-
takes or significant inefficiencies caused, for example, by strategic behavior,
coordination failure, slackness or force of habit.
For a fixed household structure, efficient household decisions together
with budget exhaustion guarantee Pareto-optimality of a competitive equilib-
rium allocation. When the household structure is variable and externalities
are present, efficient household decisions together with budget exhaustion
guarantee full Pareto-optimality in many but not all cases. It is possible
that a competitive EB-equilibrium allocation is dominated by another feasi-
ble combination of a household structure and a commodity allocation. This
can be the case even if at the equilibrium state no consumer can benefit from
exit or joining another household — as exemplified in Gersbach and Haller
(2002). In contrast, the more demanding stability condition that no group of
consumers can benefit from forming a new household has very strong welfare
implications. First of all, it induces efficient household decisions under the
hypothesis of Proposition 7. Second, a competitive EB-equilibrium (p,x;P )
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at which no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household
yields a full Pareto-optimum in the weak sense that it is impossible to make
everybody better off by means of another feasible allocation. Third, weak
Pareto-optimality can be replaced by a weak core inclusion property. To
this end, consider a non-empty subset J of I. We say that coalition J can
strictly improve upon the allocation (x;P ), if there exist a partition Q of J
into non-empty subsets and household consumption plans yh, h ∈ Q, such
that Ui(yQ(i);Q(i)) > Ui(xP(i);P (i)) for all i ∈ J and ∑i∈J yi = ∑h∈Q ωh. In
other words, a coalition can strictly improve upon the given allocation, if it
can make each of its members better off by forming a subeconomy with its
own household structure and allocation of available resources.
Proposition 8 (Weak Core Inclusion)
Let (p,x;P ) be an EB-equilibrium at which no group benefits from forming
a new household. Then no coalition of consumers can strictly improve upon
the allocation (x;P ).
proof: Let (p,x;P ) be an EB-equilibrium at which no group benefits from
forming a new household. Suppose coalition J can strictly improve upon the
allocation (x;P ) by means of a partition Q of J and household consump-
tion plans yh, h ∈ Q. Now let h ∈ Q. Then Ui(yh;h) > Ui(xP(i);P (i)) for
all i ∈ h. If h ∈ P , then p ∗ yh > pωh, since xh ∈ EBh(p). If h 6∈ P ,
then p ∗ yh > pωh, since group h cannot benefit from forming a new house-
hold. But then p
∑
i∈J yi =
∑
i∈J pyi =
∑
h∈Q
∑
i∈h pyi =
∑
h∈Q p ∗ yh >∑
h∈Q pωh = p
∑
h∈Q ωh, contradicting
∑
i∈J yi =
∑
h∈Q ωh. Hence no coali-
tion J can strictly improve upon the allocation (x;P ). Q.E.D.
If one assumes in addition the budget exhaustion property and the redis-
tribution property of Gersbach and Haller (2001), then weak core inclusion
can be replaced by strong core inclusion, that is the assertion that no coali-
tion of consumers can weakly improve upon the allocation (x;P ).
7 Concluding Remarks
The basic premise of this and our previous work is that the allocation of
resources among consumers and the ensuing welfare properties are obviously
affected by the specifics of a pre-existing partition of the population into
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households and the way households make decisions. Conversely, the forma-
tion and dissolution of households can be driven in part by economic expecta-
tions. Becker (1978, 1993) has explored and popularized this idea. Gersbach
and Haller (2001, 2002) study the simultaneous allocation of consumers and
commodities in a general equilibrium context where households are assumed
to make efficient consumption decisions. In the previous section, we recon-
sider the simultaneous allocation of consumers and commodities and identify
circumstances where household stability requires efficient internal distribu-
tion, although in principle households could make inefficient choices.
The occurrence of inefficient household decisions has been emphasized in
some of the empirical literature. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that
decentralized decision-making within households can be inefficient is pro-
vided by Udry (1996). He finds that within Burkina Faso farm households
(within certain regions), plots controlled by the women in a household tend
to be farmed less intensively than similar plots controlled by the men of the
same household. Udry estimates that about 6% of output is lost because of
inefficient factor allocation within households, assuming decreasing returns
to labor inputs. Our findings in the previous section imply that (the degree
of) inefficiency is not merely an inherent property of the household, but is to
some extent an endogenous phenomenon and depends on the conditions un-
der which the household operates. This observation applies immediately to
the case of inefficiency reported by Udry. Inefficient factor allocation within
the household is the kind of mistake that can be rectified at the household
level and, therefore, gives rise to a sub-optimal allocation for the economy.
Together with other causes — e.g. acquisition and preservation of land prop-
erty rights through cultivation; non-contractible intra-household allocations
— a lock-in situation for married women, that is a lack of outside options
can be one of the causes that help perpetuate those inefficiencies.
Giving up the collective rationality postulate amounts to working with
fewer structural restrictions, which makes it harder to draw specific conclu-
sions. But some systematic analysis proves possible once one differentiates
with respect to the kind of inefficiency. The elementary analysis in Sections
4 and 5 revealed that a particular type of household inefficiency does not
rule out market efficiency. Thus inefficiency begets efficiency. The analysis
also has identified certain inefficient household decisions that always cause
an inefficient market allocation. In either case, the household simply makes
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a mistake — possibly due to difficulties related to collective decision-making.
Frictions in collective decision-making could manifest themselves in a dif-
ferent form, not analyzed in the present paper: through resources used up in
the decision-making process. But then Pareto-optimality in the usual sense
might no longer be the appropriate efficiency standard, since very likely re-
source costs would accrue as well when an outsider tried to interfere in the
household’s economic affairs. Coase (1990), p. 26, makes a similar obser-
vation with respect to production: “... the mere existence of ‘externalities’
does not, of itself, provide any reason for governmental interventions. ......
The fact that governmental intervention also has its costs makes it very likely
that most ‘externalities’ should be allowed to be continued, if the value of
production is to be maximized.”
Regarding the original, broader question whether distinguishing between
a household and its members makes any difference, Haller (2000) compares
the case of efficient collective household decisions and the case where each
household member shops on her own with her own interest in mind — after
being allotted suitable income or endowment shares. In the absence of any
externalities and with standard monotonicity and smoothness conditions,
there is no difference. If, however, intra-household externalities are present,
then as a rule, there is a significant difference. Individual market partici-
pants do not fully internalize intra-household externalities. Thus individual
behavior can impede collective rationality. In this paper we have shown that
competition for resources and members may restore collective rationality.
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